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The problem of cooperation1−8 is that defection is evolutionarily stable. If
everybody in a population defects and one individual cooperates then this indi-
vidual has a lower payoﬀ and will be opposed by selection. Thus, the emergence
of cooperation is thought to require speciﬁc mechanisms: for example, several
cooperators have to arise simultaneously to overcome an invasion barrier9 or
arise as spatial clusters10,11. This understanding is based on traditional con-
cepts of evolutionary stability and dynamics of inﬁnite populations12−16. Here
we study evolutionary game dynamics in ﬁnite populations17−20 and show that
a single cooperator using a reciprocal strategy3,21 can invade a population of
defectors with a probability that corresponds to a net selective advantage. We
specify the conditions for natural selection to favor the emergence of coopera-
tion and derive conditions for evolutionary stability in ﬁnite populations.
Explaining the evolution of cooperation by natural selection has been a major theme
of evolutionary biology since Darwin. The standard game dynamical formulation, which
captures the essence of the problem, is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the non-repeated game,
defection dominates cooperation. In the repeated game, stratetegies like tit-for-tat (TFT)
or win-stay, lose-shift allow cooperation, but the question is how do they arise in the ﬁrst
place? Always defect (AllD) is evolutionarily stable against invasion by TFT in traditional
game dynamics of inﬁnite populations.
Let us investigate a game between two strategies, A and B, with payoﬀ matrix


AB
Aab
Bcd

. (1)
1If A and B denote, respectively, TFT and AllD, then we normally have a>c>d>b .I n
this case, both TFT and AllD are strict Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strate-
gies (ESS). Deterministic replicator dynamics of inﬁnite populations admit an unstable
equilibrium at a frequency of TFT given by x∗ =( d − b)/(a − b − c + d). If the initial
frequency of TFT is less than this value, then it will be eliminated by natural selection.
TFT can only replace AllD if its initial frequency exceeds this invasion barrier.
Let us now study a stochastic process describing a ﬁnite population of size N.A t
each time step, one individuals is chosen for reproduction proportional to ﬁtness. The
oﬀspring replaces a randomly chosen individual. The population size is strictly constant22.
The ﬁtness of each player depends on the number of TFT or AllD players. In addition,
we introduce a parameter w, which determines the contribution of the game’s payoﬀ to
ﬁtness. This parameter, quantifying the intensity of selection, cancels out in deterministic
replicator dynamics of inﬁnite populations, but plays a crucial role in ﬁnite populations,
as we shall see.
We can calculate the probability, ρ, that starting from a single individual strategy A
will invade and take over a population of B players (Methods). For a neutral mutant this
ﬁxation probability is ρ =1 /N (Ref 23). If ρ>1/N then selection favors A replacing B.
In Fig. 1, we show that in the case of TFT and AllD, Nρ is a one-humped function of N.
For a wide choice of parameter values, a,b,c,d and w, there is an intermediate range of
population sizes,N, with Nρ > 1. Thus, the invasion and replacement of AllD by TFT,
starting from a single indiviudal of TFT, can be favored by natural selection. Interestingly,
there are critical minimum and maximum population sizes that allow positive selection of
TFT: in very small populations, helping a competitor leads to a signiﬁcant disadvantage;
in very large populations, the selection against TFT at low frequencies is too strong.
Thus, neither small nor large but intermediate population sizes are optimum for initiating
cooperation.
Can we derive the underlying prinicple that determines whether a particular payoﬀ
matrix (1) allows selection for TFT replacing AllD? The exact expression for ρ is com-
plicated. The condition ρ>1/N requires the solution of N-th order polynomials, and a
diﬀusion approximation yields transcendental equations. Nevertheless, the the following
2surprisingly simple theorem holds. For a given population size N and suﬃciently weak
selection (small w), selection favors TFT replacing AllD if
a(N − 2) + b(2N − 1) >c (N +1 )+d(2N − 4). (2)
For the smallest possible population size, N = 2 (it takes two to play), we obtain b>c .
For the limit of large N, we obtain a +2 b>c+2 d. The latter condition is equivalent to
x∗ < 1/3. Therefore, if the invasion barrier of TFT is less than 1/3, there will be positive
selection for TFT to replace AllD in a ﬁnite population.
In general, for any two strategies which are best replies to themselves, we ﬁnd that
selection can favor A replacing B for some N and w,i fb>cor x∗ < 1/3 (Fig 2).
Our results have immediate consequences for the concept of evolutionary stability. The
well-known deﬁnition of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is motivated by selection
dynamics in inﬁnite populations8. Strategy B is ESS if either (i) d>bor (ii) d = b and
a<c . These conditions imply that selection opposes the spread of inﬁnitesimal small
fractions of A players in inﬁnitely large populations of B.
For ﬁnite population size, N, we propose that B is an evolutionarily stable strategy,
ESSN, if two conditions hold: (i) selection opposes A invading B, which means that a
single mutant of A in a population of B players has a lower ﬁtness; and (ii) selection
opposes A replacing B, which means ρ<1/N. Therefore, strategy B is ESSN if
(i) b(N − 1) <c+ d(N − 2)
(ii) a(N − 2) + b(2N − 1) <c (N +1 )+d(2N − 4)
(3)
For N = 2 both conditions reduce to b<c . For large populations, the two conditions
lead to b<dand x∗ > 1/3, respectively. Hence, for small populations the traditional
ESS concept is neither necessary nor suﬃcient; for large populations, it is necessary but
not suﬃcient (Fig 3). If we consider a game with many diﬀerent strategies, then the two
conditions must hold in paiwise comparison with every other strategy.
Summing up, (i) in ﬁnite populations, natural selection can favor the invasion and
replacement of always defect by a reciprocal strategy when starting from a single individual
using that strategy. No other mechanism is required. (ii) For any two strategies, natural
3selection can favor A replacing B in a ﬁnite population provided b>cor a−c>2(d−b). If
A and B are best replies to themselves then the latter condition implies that the frequency
of A at the unstable equilibrium, x∗, must be less than 1/3. (iii) Our analysis leads to
natural conditions for evolutionary stability in ﬁnite populations. These conditions specify
whether a given resident strategy is protected by selection against invasion and replacement
of a mutant strategy.
Methods:
1. Game dynamics in ﬁnite populations
The ﬁtness of strategies A and B with payoﬀ matrix (1) is, respectively, given by
fi =1− w + w[a(i − 1) + b(N − i)]/[N − 1]
gi =1− w + w[ci + d(N − i − 1)]/[N − 1]
(4)
Here i denotes the number of individuals using strategy A, and w ∈ [0,1] speciﬁes the
contribution of the game to ﬁtness.
Let us calculate the probability, ρ, that a single individual A can invade and take over
a population of B players. More precisely, ρ is the probability that the stochastic process
starting from i = 1 reaches the absorbing state i = N rather than i = 0. We obtain24
ρ =1 /(1 +
N−1 X
k=1
k Y
i=1
gi
fi
). (5)
If ρ>1/N then selection favors A replacing B.
The rate of evolution from all-A to all-B is given by r = Nρu, where u is the mutation
rate. We can rescale the rate of evolution in units of u. Thus, we set u = 1. The rate of
evolution, r can be an increasing, decreasing or one-humped function of the intensity of
selection, w, but the following properties are essential for our theorem: (i) r =1i fw =0
and (ii) if dr/dw < 0 then r<1 for all w ∈ (0,1].
In the limit of weak selection, w< <1, we ﬁnd that
Nρ≈ 1/[1 − (αN − β)(w/6)] (6)
4with α = a+2b−c−2d and β =2 a+b+c−4d. From this equation, we see that Nρ>1i f
αN > β which leads to (2). If α>0 then there is a minimum N for which Nρcan exceed
1. It is given by Nmin = β/α.
2. TFT and AllD
Let strategies A and B denote, respectively, TFT and AllD in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
which is repeated for n rounds on average. The payoﬀ matrix is a = Rn, b = S +P(n−1),
c = T + P(n − 1) and d = Pn. The parameters of the Prisoner’s Dilemma are the reward
for mutual cooperation, R, the punishment for mutual defection P, the sucker’s payoﬀ for
cooperating with a defector, S, and the temptation for defecting against a cooperator, T.
Since T>R>P>S ,w eh a v ea>c>d>bprovided that n>(T − P)/(R − P), which
is the minimum number of rounds such that AllD does not dominate TFT.
Condition (2) implies n(R − P)(N − 2) >T(N +1 )− S(2N − 1) + P(N − 2). This
determines the minimum number of rounds required for selection to favor TFT replacing
AllD for a given population size N. We need at least N = 3. Let R =3 ,T =5 ,P =1 ,
S = 0. For N = 3 we have n>10.5. For N = 4 we have n>6.75. For large N we need
n>3. Similar calculations can be performed for other reciprocal strategies and including
errors.
3. Remarks on ESS
If d>bthen B is both a strict Nash equilibrium and an ESS in comparison with A.
What is the maximum probability ρ of A replacing B in large populations, N →∞ ?W e
are free to choose a and c. In order to maximize ρ, we set a →∞and c = 0. Then we
obtain ρ =[ 1− w(1 − b)]/[2 − w(2 − b − d)]. For w → 0 we have ρ =1 /2. For w =1w e
have ρ = b/(b + d). Hence there can be enormous selection pressure for replacement of a
strict Nash equilibrium even in the limit N →∞ .
A strict Nash equilibrium implies protection by selection against replacement in the
following sense: for a given payoﬀ matrix (a,b,c,d) with d>band for a given intensity of
selection, w>0, we have ρ → 0a sN →∞ .
For every ﬁnite population size, N, however, we can calculate the maximum net
selective advantage for a mutant replacing a strict Nash equilibrium. Given b,d with
5d>b . Let c = 0 and w = 1. Calculate ρ for an arbitrarily large, but ﬁnite N. Let a →∞ .
We have ρ → b/(b + d). This probability of ﬁxation corresponds to a constant relative
ﬁtness of 1 + (b/d) or a net selective advantage of b/d.
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Figure legends
Fig. 1: Selection can favor the replacement of AllD by TFT in ﬁnite populations. (a)
The rate of evolution, Nρ, is a one humped function of population size N. There is an
intermediate range of N which leads to positive selection of TFT, Nρ > 1. (b) Nρ is
shown as function of w, the intensity of selection. For small N, we have Nρ<1 for all w.
For larger N we have Nρ > 1 for all w. For even larger N we have Nρ > 1 as long as w
is below a certain threshold. (c,d) The blue shaded region indicates the parameter region
where Nρ>1. The light blue line shows the optimum value of N for given w maximizing
Nρ. The broken red line indicates Nmin =( 2 a+ b+ c −4d)/(a+2b− c − 2d) which is the
predicted minimum population size required for positive selection of TFT in the limit of
weak selection. Parameter choices: R =3 ,T =5 ,P =1 ,S =0 ;n = 10 rounds for (a-c)
and n = 4 rounds for (d).
Fig. 2: (a) The 1/3 law of frequency dependent evolution. Suppose A and B are best
replies to themselves, meaning a>cand d>bin payoﬀ matrix (1). In this case all-A
and all-B are stable equilibria of the replicator dynamics for inﬁnite population size. The
unstable equilibrium is located at a frequency of A given by x∗ =( d−b)/(a−b−c+d). If
x∗ < 1/3 then A can replace B by positive selection in a suﬃciently large, ﬁnite population.
The minumum population size we need is given by Nmin =( 2 a+b+c−4d)/(a+2b−c−2d)
7in the case of weak selection w → 0. (b,c) A strategy is ESSN if it is protected by selection
against invasion and replacement by another strategy for given population size N.I n
the ﬁrst case, both A and B are clasical ESS, but for 2 ≤ N ≤ 12 only B is ESSN, for
12 <N<53 both A and B are ESSN, for N ≥ 53 only A is ESSN. In the second case, B
dominates A, but for 2 ≤ N ≤ 17 only A is ESSN. For 17 <N<22 both A and B are
ESSN.F o rN ≥ 22 only B is ESSN. These examples illustrate that for small populations
the traditional concept of ESS is neither necessary nor suﬃcient to imply ESSN and for
large populations it is necessary but not suﬃcient.
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